One might well infer, from a number of passages in Wittgenstein's On Certainty, that that philosopher held (i) that all justification is within a system 1 ; (ii) that the system does not ultimately depend on what we see or perceive, but on how we act 2 ; (iii) that how we act, and the system of presuppositions which depends on this and within which all argument makes sense, differs radically from place to place and from time to time ; 3 yet (iv) that we feel inclined to say that the possibility of such a system and of the way of acting which underlies it depends on certain facts. 
The moral may be and has been drawn as follows. As human beings living in the place and at the time that we do, we have certain assumptions about how things are which are not questioned, and which are inextricably bound up with our whole way of living and acting. It is useless to ask how these can be justified, since all attempts at justification themselves presuppose them. Other human beings at other places and times have presuppositions which are utterly different from ours; to say that these are not justifiable, or that they fail to represent the truth about the world, is simply to emphasize their difference from our own.
According to this view, which seems to commend itself to many sociologists and a few philosophers, what is to count as evidence on any matter, and why it is to do so, are simply up to human groups to determine; and there is no criterion, apart from disagreement with other groups, by which such a decision could conceivably be wrong. Now according to the usual understanding of what is meant by 'rational' and what is meant by 'evidence', at least some members of some societies can, by rational consideration of evidence, come to know what would have been the case even if they had never considered that evidence, or indeed if they and the societies of which they are members had never existed at all. Such, it would usually be supposed, is our knowledge of white dwarfs and of plesiosauruses. If this is so, then the nature of rationality and evidence is dependent on what is the case prior to and independently of social convention, and not merely on social convention. If they did depend entirely on social convention, we jLnscussion would not be able to employ them to determine what is the case prior to; and independently of social convention. It would follow that natural; science as generally understood is impossible; and that the universe which • we are supposed progressively to come to know about by its means would be a social product, rather than society being a product of the processes of the universe, as science would unite with common sense in maintaining that it is.
As examples of writers who have interpreted Wittgenstein to this effect, I take the sociologists Derek Phillips and David Bloor. To be sure, Phillips states that Wittgenstein's later work provides a middle ground between the absolutist and relativist extremes in the theory of knowledge.
5 But the alleged middle ground soon subsides into an extreme and bizarre form of relativism. 'I am rejecting the conception of objectivity as correspondence with some mind-independent, and therefore mind-inaccessible reality in itself. Rather, I conceive of objectivity as that which meets public, intersubjective standards for warranting objectivity in particular scientific communities'. 6 But it may be asked in virtue of what, apart from mere fiat, the methods and standards of communities dignified by the epithet 'scientific' are more 'objective' than those of groups of astrologers, Catholics, schizophrenics, Taoists or confidence tricksters, unless one assumes that they are especially suitable for gaining knowledge of a reality which exists prior to and independently of our investigation of it.
Phillips maintains that Wittgenstein's later work is directed against the assumption that words in an utterance are somehow correlated with objects for which the words stand. 'This idea assumes that all language has a particular use or employment, and Wittgenstein insists that there is a "multiplicity of language-games"'. 7 But the mere existence of such a multiplicity of language-games has no such implications as Phillips claims. It only implies that, if it is a function of language to make assertions about a reality which exists largely prior to and independently of human communities and their language, this is only one of its functions.
At the end of his book, Phillips raises the question of how the views which he himself puts forward are to be justified; never did a writer more adroitly saw off the branch upon which he is sitting:
What validates the view of reality and science set forward in this volume? After all, I cannot argue that my view corresponds to 'true' or 'authentic' reality, to the way things 'really' are.
And what if his reader persists in holding views contradictory to his own?
If I wish to avoid exempting myself from my own thesis, I cannot meaningfully speak of false consciousness or mistakes here-as if I had some privileged access to reality . . ., and could compare the way things 'really' are with your false and mistaken . . . views. No, I must in the final analysis rest content with my commitment to a conception which I find more comfortable, pleasing, and useful for me. 8 A very similar account of Wittgenstein is found in an article by David Bloor. The status of logic and mathematics, says Bloor, is one of the central problems in the sociology of knowledge. As he sees it, Wittgenstein's work on the foundations of mathematics 'shows how sociology can penetrate to the very basis of these topics'. 9 The error which Wittgenstein exposes, we are told, is that of seeing mathematics and logic 'as being about a body of truths which exist in their own right independently of whether anyone believes them or knows about them'. 10 This error can be avoided, according to Bloor, if one characterizes properly the activities of counting, calculating (and so on) which are at the base of mathematics. It is often protested that if these do not reflect absolute necessities, they must merely be subject to individual caprice. 'Wittgenstein avoids this dilemma by stressing social processes'.
11 In one passage of his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics he takes that process of using a formula which is basic to arithmetic, and shows 'the necessity of embedding it in standardized social practice. The crucial terms are sociological; "the way we always use it", "the way we are taught to use it" . . . from this perspective, every instance of the use of a formula is the culmination of a process of socialization.'
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If we are thus trapped in our own procedures, it might be asked, how can we attain a vantage-point from which we can study with fairness procedures different from our own? Bloor's answer is that 'one set of taken-for-granted procedures can be utilized to study another set'. 13 Bloor thinks that his conclusions on logic and mathematics apply a fortiori to other kinds of knowledge; there is no truth which is not simply 'truth for' some special group, no valid form of argument which is not merely a form of argument accepted by a social group. 14 If it is not the case in logic or in mathematics that the investigator's behaviour 'is structured by the pre-existing logic of the connections that he is exploring', 15 still less is it the case in the study of the fabric of the heavens, the structure of the atom, the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough, or the evolution of the marsupial mammals.
To dilate upon the absurdities entailed by extreme conventionalism and relativism is not my principal object. What I want to do next is to suggest what more plausible and useful account of the ultimate conditions of justification, and of the relation of language to the world, might be come to on the basis of the passages I referred to at the beginning and other similar remarks of Wittgenstein. What I shall say on this matter follows the lead of several contemporary philosophers, 16 though it conflicts with the most obvious interpretation of others.
On occasions Wittgenstein talks about 'the' language-game, as though there were in a sense only one such. 17 This invites a speculation which may perhaps prove fruitful; is there by any chance a single set of basic assumptions and procedures in all use of language whatever, or at least in all language used for stating what is the case; and not simply an indefinitely large range of assumptions and procedures which differ radically according to place and time? Are there any grounds for holding that there is such a set, or even-canvassing a possibility that Wittgenstein in his last work does seem definitely to reject 18 -of justifying the assumptions and procedures? Wittgenstein speaks of our knowledge as forming part of a system. Is it possible to give some account of this system and its presuppositions, to find out what we take for granted as committed to the system, and perhaps to consider also how far we are right to take it for granted? It appears to me that a hint as to how this might be done is given by Aristotle, when he is speaking of how one should deal with sceptics. The great thing is simply to get the sceptic to say something. Let us suppose he says that scepticism is true, or that one can know nothing. .L/iscussion the principle, which is itself subversive of a thoroughgoing scepticism, that one tends to get at the truth by having good reasons for what one says. Let us apply the hint to our present problem. Aristotle shows that it cannot but be true that some of our judgments are true, on the ground that the contradictory of this thesis 'self-destructs', as Germain Grisez has put it.
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It has been claimed, rightly in my view, that it can be shown in similar fashion that it cannot but be true that we tend to come to make true judgments so far as we go about it in the right way; and that the right way to go about it is (i) to attend to evidence, (ii) to think up a range of possibilities which might account for it, and (iii) to judge as (probably or certainly) the case that possibility which seems best supported by the evidence. Suppose someone denies that we tend to get to make true judgments by using the sort of method that I have just outlined. Does he do so as the result of having attended to the evidence bearing on the matter, of having thought of possible ways in which it might be accounted for, and of having judged that what he asserts is the one among these that fits the evidence best? If he does not, it is not worth attending to him. But if he does, he has used to justify his statement those very operations whose role in justifying statements his statement denies. 20 Philosophers have looked for the foundations of knowledge, and for the place where, in Wittgenstein's phrase, 'language hooks on to the world', in propositions which are certain; and they have tended to identify this certainty either with analyticity, or with direct confrontation in experience. The reasons for supposing that such alleged foundations will not support the fabric to be raised upon them are sufficiently well known. But there is a third kind of certainty which tends to be overlooked, which I think Wittgenstein at least adumbrates in On Certainty; that the foundations of knowledge, and of 'the* language-game so far as there is just one, consist in propositions whose contradictories, though not self-contradictory, are yet self-destructive in the manner which I have sketched. The certainty of these propositions does not consist in their immediately striking us as true, but rather in that we discover that they could not but be true once we have attended to their implications.
In tions which men do in fact utter'. Whatever it is that must be true about the world for people to be able to talk about it at all may be said to constitute a kind of a priori. In the early Notebooks Wittgenstein wrote: 'The general question round which everything that I write turns is: is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in?' 22 Roughly, one might put it that, if what I have been saying is on the right lines, the a priori order which is in the world is to be discerned from the method that we have of coming to make true judgments; given that the judgments that the world is what true judgments are about, and that we are able in general to come to make true judgments by a method which is in principle reliable, are such that their negation is self-destructive. However, Anthony Kenny adduces a number of texts which indicate that throughout the rest of his life, from the Tractatus onwards, Wittgenstein upheld the doctrine that any proposition which can be true can be false, with a consequent rejection of any synthetic a priori. 23 And in the Grammatik Wittgenstein says that 'the rules of grammar cannot be justified by showing that their application makes a representation agree with reality'. 24 But, so far as this implies, as I think it does, that we cannot show that by using our thought and our language we may come to speak about a world which existed largely prior to and independently of us and our language, it seems to be false for the reasons which I have given. At this rate, it could remain that every nonanalytic proposition which could be true could be false, in one sense of 'could' though not in another. Some assertions, that is, while not selfcontradictory, are yet self-destructive.
I think that Wittgenstein comes quite close to such a position, and thus in a sense to vindicating the a priori after all, in what he has to say about doubt in On Certainty. He maintains that there is a difference between cases where doubt is unreasonable, and where it is logically impossible; though he denies that there is a clear boundary between the two kinds of case. 25 That Cartesian doubt is self-destructive in that it seems to call in question the very meaning of the words used to express it, is hinted many times in On Certainty. 26 You can only doubt, as he rightly says, where you can test. 27 He adds that tests presuppose what is not doubted or tested;
and that 'our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like the hinges on which those turn'. 29 What is the nature of these hinges on which doubt turns? Do they differ with the doubt, or with the social milieu of the doubt, or are they the same always and for everyone? Of course, either the first or the second is right if one means what is taken for granted as a matter of fact in particular instances of doubt. But if one means those assumptions upon which all doubt depends, and on which it ought to depend, then it seems to follow from what I have already argued that the third must be right. For if there are no 'hinges on which doubt turns' which are and ought to be always the same for everyone, one is inevitably plunged into conventionalism and relativism.
It is true that 'I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness', and very likely indeed that 'it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false'. 30 But the fact that one's picture of the world does not come to one with a critical basis does not entail that it cannot be supplied with one. And once it is thus supplied, there are means for distinguishing in principle between those aspects of one's inherited view of the world which certainly or probably get it right, and those which get it wrong.
Of the theses tentatively ascribed to Wittgenstein on page 251 above, it looks as though we were committed to acceptance of the first and fourth, and rejection or modification of the second and third. Thus (i) all justification is within a system; (ii) the system does not ultimately depend on what we see or perceive, or even on how we happen to act, but rather on how we cannot but judge of things on pain of self-destructiveness in our judgments; (iii) consequently there are limits to the variation from place to place and from time to time of the system of presuppositions within which all argument makes sense; and (iv) the possibility of such a system, and the way of acting which goes with it, depends on the fact that the world cannot but be of such a nature that it is possible for us to make true judgments about it which are based upon good evidence.
There remain some rather apocalyptic conclusions to be drawn. Let us consider the following three propositions:
( stance is absolutely true; but cannot be shown to be true, or more I likely to be true than its rivals, on general rational criteria available in • principle to every intelligent person. (3) That some world-view, ideology or religious stance is absolutely : true; and can be shown to be true, or at least more likely to be true ; than its contradictory, on such general rational criteria.
I have tried to show that (1) is absurd, for all that parts of On Certainty have seemed to some to show that Wittgenstein believed it. What about • (2)? Hume said, in a famous phrase, that while errors in religion were dangerous, those in philosophy were merely ridiculous. Here, I believe, is ; an exception; proposition (2) is very dangerous indeed. Either basic differences about how the world is, and what one ought to do about it, are trivial; or people will be concerned to resolve them. They are hardly trivial, since people's whole way of life, and the ends they pursue and think worth pursuing, depend on them. So people certainly will try to resolve them, or at least to secure sufficient basic agreement on them for society to go on functioning. General principles of rationality, ex hypothesi, do not exist to be invoked; coercion, with the guns and the thumbscrews, is the only way left.
Someone might object that even if proposition (2) has consequences which are unpleasant from a practical point of view, it could still be true. But it can scarcely be so if, as I have been arguing, there is a non-contingent connection between the truth about things and what we tend to get to believe by following the principles described. What is wrong with it is succinctly set out in the maxim, quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur. As Marx put it in an early article, 31 if you claim that your own position is not to be argued for, why should not the same be claimed for a quite different one?
So we come to the third proposition. Radical empiricism and scientism on the one hand, and the older forms of natural theology on the other, are odd bedfellows; but both are committed to this proposition. They agree that, unless there are good reasons, which do not assume what has to be established, for believing (for example) in God, one ought not to believe in him; where they differ is in their account of what the good reasons amount to, and consequently in their actual theological conclusions. The Tractatus seems to help towards providing a way of supporting proposition (3); here, we appear to be told, is how we are to come to speak of a world which exists independently of our thought and speech about it. Wittgenstein's later position, which may so easily be interpreted as issuing in propositions (1) or (2), is partly due, according to Roger White, 32 to his conviction that the Tractatus position, while it could not be sustained, was the only alternative. The empiricism which culminated in the work of Russell and the logical positivists was one way of supporting proposition (3). I believe that empiricists are right in insisting that a general criterion for getting at the truth can and should be found, but wrong in their account of what the general criterion is; it is this, and not proposition (3) itself, which is in my view really refuted by the arguments which have been used against them by Wittgenstein and others. I tried to suggest, in the central section of the paper, how one might move towards finding the right criterion. Wittgenstein's influence, I believe, ought to be a powerful incentive to finding out a better articulation of the manner in which the truth about things can in general be found and should in general be sought, since he has brilliantly brought out so many of the difficulties in the way. If I am right, the upshot of his work is by no means to show that the traditional problems of philosophy can be set aside; but to demonstrate just how important and indeed urgent they continue to be. 33 In preparing this paper, I have been greatly helped by discussions with Christopher Coope, Peter Geach, Ullin Place, George Ross and Roger White.
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